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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Begun in the 1950s, the drafting of the Model Penal Code (the Code) 
differed from the typical American Law Institute (ALI) “restatement” of 
the law project because it was an explicit attempt to provide a model 
statute that would advance doctrine and practice rather than merely 
describe it.1 Scores of lawyers, judges, academics and policymakers 
actively participated in the process of devising the Code. Their efforts paid 
off. As Gerard Lynch wrote in 1998, “[t]he Model Penal Code is among 
the most successful academic law reform projects ever attempted.”2 During 
the 1960s and 1970s, well over half the states revamped their criminal 
statutes to conform them more closely to the Code.3 
 
                                                                                                                     
 * Milton Underwood Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University Law School. 
 1. Herbert Wechsler, Sentencing, Correction, and the Model Penal Code, 109 U. PA. L. 
REV. 465, 466–67 (1961) (“Unlike the Restatements, we are not attempting to articulate prevailing 
law . . . we aim to build the source materials required for the reexamination and revision of our 
penal codes that is so badly needed throughout the country.”). 
 2. Gerard E. Lynch, Towards a Model Penal Code, Second (Federal?): The Challenge of 
the Special Part, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 297, 297 (1998). 
 3. Herbert Wechsler, Foreword to MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES: PART I §§ 6.01 
to 7.09, at i, xi (1985).  
1
Slobigin: Introduction to the Symposium on the Model Penal Code's Sentencin
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2009
666 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61 
 
The Code’s most popular innovations were the liability rules found in 
its so-called “general” provisions, which address overarching conduct and 
mental state requirements, attempt and conspiracy rules, imputation 
doctrines such as complicity, and the defenses.4 The Code’s definitions of 
“specific” offenses were not as influential.5 But they too were innovative 
and are still taught in American law schools as a coherent alternative to 
existing federal and state provisions.6  
The Code’s sentencing provisions, in contrast, were hardly novel for the 
time and have received little academic attention. Those provisions adopted 
a relatively indeterminate approach to sentencing that relied on a non-
prioritized list of dispositional goals, sentences with wide ranges, and 
release-decision-making by parole boards.7 Thus, the Model Penal Code’s 
sentencing provisions came much closer to a restatement of practices 
widely extant at the time than a fresh analytical look at how sentencing 
should be carried out.8 More importantly, the wave of sentencing reform 
that has taken place in the past three to four decades roundly rejected the 
Code’s rehabilitative focus. Instead, the federal government and more than 
twenty states have moved toward a more determinate sentencing 
framework that limits judicial discretion, reduces or eliminates parole 
board authority, and tends to place greater emphasis on sentences that 
implement a just deserts philosophy in which efforts to reform prisoners 
play a secondary role.9  
Thus, in 1999 the ALI decided to revisit the sentencing provisions of 
the Code and appointed Professor Gerard Lynch as Reporter for the 
revision project, which was entitled Model Penal Code: Sentencing 
(MPCS).10 In 2001, when Lynch joined the federal bench, Professor Kevin 
Reitz became the Reporter for the MPCS.11 Reitz has since carried out the 
gargantuan task of drafting black letter revisions and commentary, 
providing research materials to the ALI’s various consulting groups, and 
shepherding the revisions through the complicated ALI vetting process. 
                                                                                                                     
 4. Lynch, supra note 2, at 297–98. 
 5. Id. at 299–300. 
 6. Most criminal law casebooks set out both the general and special parts of the Model 
Penal Code and include problems that require delving into the latter. S e, e.g., MARKUS D. DUBBER 
&  MARK G. KELMAN , AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW: CASES, STATUTES AND COMMENTS A-55 to A-90 
(2d ed. 2009); PAUL H. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW: CASE STUDIES AND CONTROVERSIES 1118–57 (2d 
ed. 2008). 
 7. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 6.10 (1962). 
 8. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING, Reporter’s Introductory Memorandum xxviii–xxix 
(Tentative Draft No. 1, 2007). 
 9. Richard S. Frase, State Sentencing Guidelines: Diversity, Consensus, and Unresolved 
Policy Issues, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1190, 1202–03 (2005). 
 10. Lance Liebman, MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING REPORT, Foreward i, xi–xii (2003). 
 11. Id. at xii. 
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The revision process to date can be divided into three stages: (1) 
preliminary conceptual work by Professor Reitz; (2) the adoption of 
Tentative Draft No. 1 by the ALI; and (3) the drafting of Tentative Draft 
No. 2 (also called the Council Draft in this article). After discussing these 
three stages, this article summarizes the six articles that follow, each of 
which provides a unique glimpse into the substance and rationale of the 
MPCS project.  
II.   PRELIMINARY STEPS IN THE MPCS PROCESS 
The prospectus prepared by Professor Reitz in 2001 when he began as 
MPCS Reporter laid out an ambitious agenda, organized under three 
categories: sentencing structure, substantive sentencing policy, and 
sentencing process.12 The primary structural issue he identified was the 
proper assignment of sentencing authority.13 The drafters of the original 
Code assumed that risk assessment and rehabilitation could be carried out 
fairly effectively, and thus left the ultimate duration and nature of 
sentences largely up to parole boards.14 But, according to Reitz, “[t]he 
research consensus today is that . . . the aggregate crime-reduction returns 
from [rehabilitative] programs have been disappointing.”15 Furthermore, 
“no one has mounted a persuasive defense of rehabilitation theory 
sufficient to reinstate it as the dominant purpose of criminal penalties, nor 
has anyone produced a serious defense of the distribution of sentencing 
authorities within indeterminate structures.”16  
Thus, Reitz suggested that the ALI consider adoption of the 
“guidelines” approach that has been at the center of most reform proposals 
over the past several decades.17 Although numerous types of guidelines 
systems exist, all are the product of deliberations by sentencing 
commissions and consist of sentencing ranges for each offense that, 
compared to the usual indeterminate sentencing system, are meant to 
provide more direction to judges at the front-end and diminish the role of 
parole boards at the back-end. The possible advantages of such a system, 
Reitz noted, include greater predictability and fairness in sentencing 
outcomes and increased transparency in the disposition decision-making 
process.18 Moreover, such systems can enhance control over the costs and 
                                                                                                                     
 12. Kevin R. Reitz, A Proposal for Revision of the Sentencing Articles of the Model Penal 
Code (Working Draft 2001). 
 13. Id. at 2–3. 
 14. Id. at 3–4. 
 15. Id. at 4. 
 16. Id. at 5. 
 17. Id. at 10. 
 18. Id. at 5–6 (recounting commentators’ arguments that indeterminate sentencing is deficient 
in achieving either of these goals). 
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use of imprisonment because of the sentencing commission’s access to and 
expertise in evaluating system-wide data and the greater ease with which 
forecasts about prison populations can be made when sentences must 
adhere to statewide criteria.19 Anticipating some negative reaction to the 
guidelines idea from those familiar with the federal system,20 Reitz also 
cautioned that the various flaws in that much-maligned guidelines 
regime—which is based almost entirely on retributive principles, is 
relatively inflexible, and micro-manages the sentencing decision through a 
large number of variables—are not necessarily replicated in most state 
guidelines systems, which often provide greater discretion to judges and 
contemplate that multiple purposes can be implemented through 
sentencing.21 
Consistent with the latter observation, Reitz’s discussion of possible 
approaches to substantive sentencing policy—his second general reform 
category—did not reject rehabilitation out-of-hand.22 Reitz noted that, in 
contrast to the federal system, many states guidelines systems have relied 
on a “mixed formula of utilitarian and moral purposes,” albeit a formula 
that usually uses desert to set the lower and upper penalty limits.23 Reitz 
also proposed that the ALI consider a number of other substantive 
innovations that the original Code did not mention, including: mechanisms 
for reducing prison growth; the adoption of procedures for obtaining 
information about minority sentencing; the expanded use of “intermediate 
sanctions” such as community residential facilities, victim restitution, 
criminal forfeiture, home confinement with electronic monitoring, and 
“shaming” sanctions; and restorative justice principles that provide more 
of a role for the victim in the dispositional process.24 
The final area of potential reform Reitz identified in his prospectus was 
the sentencing process.25 Here he primarily had in mind the difficult 
question of when a fact that affects a sentence must be decided at trial by a 
jury rather than at sentencing by a judge.26 The drafters of the original 
Code were unconcerned about the issue, probably because they felt facts 
considered at sentencing would usually redound to the defendant’s benefit 
or at least be considered within a paternalistic, rehabilitative paradigm.27 
                                                                                                                     
 19. Id. at 7–8. 
 20. For one criticism of the federal guidelines system, see Albert W. Alschuler, Disparity: 
The Normative and Empirical Failure of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 58 STAN. L. REV. 85 
(2005). 
 21. Reitz, supra note 12, at 9–10. 
 22. Id. at 11–19. 
 23. Id. at 15. 
 24. See id. at 11–19. 
 25. Id. at 19. 
 26. Id.  
 27. Id. at 20–21. 
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But in recent years the Supreme Court decided Apprendi v. New Jersey,28 
Blakely v. Washington,29 and United States v. Booker,30 which together 
upend this aspect of sentencing by establishing that, under the Sixth 
Amendment, all facts enhancing a sentence beyond a mandatory guideline 
maximum must be found by a jury. Writing after Apprendi but before 
Blakely and Booker, Reitz suggested that a new Code could build upon the 
old Code’s crime definitions to distinguish between “material” trial facts 
(decided by a jury) and trial facts that can be left to sentencing (by the 
judge).31 Although Blakely and Booker now require a somewhat different 
analysis,32 considerable room remains for experimentation.33 
A Report authored by Reitz on the status of the MPCS issued two years 
into the project echoed many of the themes in his prospectus.34 A 
particularly useful elaboration of his criticism of the original Code’s 
approach is the Report’s comparison of indeterminate sentencing with 
commission-guidelines sentencing in terms of the proportion of sentence 
controlled by front-end decision-makers (legislatures, commissions and 
judges) and back-end decision-makers (correctional officials and parole 
boards). According to the Report, back-end decision-makers are typically 
responsible for between seventy-five percent and eighty-five percent of the 
sentence in indeterminate regimes but only about fifteen percent of the 
sentence in guidelines regimes.35 The Report expressed a strong preference 
for the latter type of regime because it imports the rule of law into 
sentencing, enhances the ability to implement and monitor systemic 
reforms and manage resources, and diminishes disparate and biased 
sentences.36 However, the Report, like the prospectus, cautioned against 
relying on the federal guidelines model, given its severe limits on judicial 
discretion, its complexity and rigidity, its failure to encourage alternative 
sanctions, and its tendency to ignore or be agnostic about issues of 
resource management, racial bias, and sentencing philosophy.37  
                                                                                                                     
 28. 530 U.S. 466 (2000). 
 29. 542 U.S. 296 (2004). 
 30. 543 U.S. 220 (2005).  
 31. Reitz, supra note 12, at 23. 
 32. All facts, not just “material” ones, must be found by a jury if they enhance a sentence 
beyond the guidelines maximum, unless the maximum is “advisory.” See Booker, 543 U.S. at 233–
34. 
 33. See, e.g., Frank O. Bowman, III, Beyond Band-Aids: A Proposal for Reconfiguring 
Federal Sentencing After Booker, 2005 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 149, 186–215 (describing possible 
responses to Blakely and Booker). 
 34. See generally MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING REPORT (2003). 
 35. Compare id. at 21–26 (illustrating indeterminate sentencing), with id. at 59–63 
(illustrating determinate sentencing). 
 36. Id. at 49, 63–115. 
 37. Id. at 115–25. 
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III.   TENTATIVE DRAFT NO. 1 
Despite the Blakely/Booker revolution, the ALI has made significant 
progress on the MPCS project since Reitz’s 2003 Report.38 Tentative Draft 
No. 1, dealing with sentencing goals, sentencing commissions, and the 
sentencing process, was approved by the membership of the ALI in May, 
2007.39 And since September 2008, a preliminary version of Tentative 
Draft No. 2, which focuses on the details of sentencing structure, has been 
under serious consideration by the ALI Council, preparatory to its 
submission to the full ALI membership.40 
 Probably the most important aspect of Tentative Draft No. 1 is its 
revision of the original Code’s § 1.02 regarding the purposes of the Code.41 
Whereas the old Code had specified a wide array of objectives to be 
achieved through crime definition and punishment, with no clear 
enunciation of whether or when particular goals should predominate,42 the 
new provision adopts Norval Morris’ concept of “limiting retributivism.”43 
As the commentary to the provision explains, this principle posits that 
“utilitarian goals such as rehabilitation, incapacitation, general deterrence, 
and victim and community restoration should not be allowed to produce 
sentences more or less severe than those deserved by offenders on moral 
grounds.”44 In other words, under the MPCS retributive considerations—
the relative “gravity” of the offense, harm done to the victim, and 
“blameworthiness” of the offender45—are to dictate the potential range of 
the sentence. Only within this range may considerations about the 
offender’s dangerousness and treatability or the type of message the public 
should receive influence the sentencing decision. The new purposes 
provision also displays its cautious stance toward these and other utilitarian 
objectives by stipulating that they may affect a sentence only when 
achieving them is “reasonably feasible.”46 Thus, compared to the old Code, 
Tentative Draft No. 1 gives desert a much more conspicuous role in 
                                                                                                                     
 38. Kevin R. Reitz, Demographic Impact Statements, O’Connor’s Warning, and the 
Mysteries of Prison Release: Topics from a Sentencing Reform Agenda, 61 FLA. L. REV. 683 
(2009). 
 39. Id. at 689.  
 40. Id.  
 41. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 1.02(2), at 1–2 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2007). 
 42. MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.02(2) (1962). 
 43. See NORVAL MORRIS, THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT (1974); see also Richard S. Frase, 
Sentencing Principles in Theory and Practice, in 22 CRIME AND JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH 
(Michael Tonry ed. 1997). 
 44. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 1.02(2) illus., at 4–5 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2007). 
 45. Id. § 1.02(2), at 1. Section 1.02(2)(a)(i) uses these terms to operationalize “retribution.” 
Id. at 31. It avoids the latter term because it has become “ideologically charged” and associated 
with the growth of imprisonment in recent years. Id. 
 46. Id. § 1.02(2)(a)(ii), at 1. 
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fashioning criminal sentences. It eschews the type of open-ended 
sentencing that some jurisdictions adopted to facilitate flexible 
implementation of individual prevention goals.  
At the same time, Tentative Draft No. 1 rejects not only the view that 
desert should be the sole determinant of disposition,47 but also the notion 
of some desert theorists that there is a single correct retributive punishment 
for each offender.48 Instead, it adopts Morris’ assumption that we do not 
have adequate “moral calipers” to reach such definitive conclusions and 
that, at best, we can merely ascertain when a punishment is clearly 
excessive or insufficient on desert grounds.49 The result of this reasoning is 
a statement of purpose that represents an innovative compromise between 
deontological and consequentialist principles unique among sentencing 
codes in this country. 
The new section contains a number of other interesting provisions. 
First, telegraphing a hostile stance toward the legislative tendency to 
increase sentence lengths after every moral panic, it calls for “sentences no 
more severe than necessary” to achieve the stated purposes of 
punishment,50 a declaration that the commentary calls the “parsimony” 
principle.51 Second, the section requires uniformity with respect to all 
sentencing goals, not just desert.52 Thus, some attempt apparently must be 
made not just to treat all robberies alike, but all robbers with a particular 
risk profile alike. Third, consistent with Reitz’s prospectus, it states that 
sentencing policy must be designed to reduce racial and ethnic disparities, 
encourage intermediate penalties, and “promote research on sentencing 
policy and practices,”53 so that, as the commentary to the provision puts it, 
sentencing will be “evidence-based.”54 
The next several provisions of Tentative Draft No. 1 are devoted to 
outlining the role of the sentencing Commission. Under the Draft the 
Commission would be permanent, rather than the temporary entity it has 
been in states that established commissions simply to create guidelines and 
then disbanded them.55 The Commission would also be sizeable, ranging 
                                                                                                                     
 47. See, e.g., ANDREW VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE: THE CHOICE OF PUNISHMENTS 51 (1976). 
 48. Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, Intuitions of Justice: Implications for Criminal Law 
and Justice Policy, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 34 (“[O]nce a society sets the endpoint of its punishment 
continuum [according to desert], the ordinal ranking of cases along that continuum will produce 
quite specific punishments.”). 
 49. Norval Morris & Marc Miller, Predictions of Dangerousness, in 6 CRIME AND JUSTICE: 
AN ANNUAL REVIEW OF RESEARCH 1, 37 (1985). 
 50. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 1.02(2)(a)(iii), at 1 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2007). 
 51. Id. at 13. 
 52. Id. § 1.02(2)(b)(ii), at 2. 
 53. Id. § 1.02(2)(b)(iii)–(vii), at 2. 
 54. Id. at 21. 
 55. Id. § 6A.01, at 46 (establishing permanent Commission). The commentary notes that “[a] 
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between eleven and twenty-two members,56 and diverse, in that it would 
include judges, legislators, prosecutors, defense attorneys, correctional 
authorities and members of the public.57  
Finally, the Commission would have three prominent jobs. First, it 
would be charged with developing sentencing guidelines that ensure, 
consistent with § 1.02 (but largely contrary to the federal system), that 
judges retain considerable discretion in meting out sentences within desert-
bound ranges.58 Second, during its first two years or so the Commission 
would be required to carry out detailed research about a host of issues 
relating to sentencing (including the resource and race issues already 
mentioned) to ensure that its development of the guidelines is based on 
sound information.59 Third, it would have an ongoing responsibility to 
review the efficacy of the sentencing regime, to keep statistics that assist in 
developing rational sentencing policy, and to make recommendations to 
the legislature consistent with that policy.60  
Tentative Draft No. 1 then describes in more detail the contours of the 
Commission’s first job, the development of sentencing guidelines. 
Consistent with § 1.02, it calls for “presumptive guidelines” that may not 
exceed the range dictated by desert but that can be further refined within 
those limits by reference to realistic utilitarian goals.61 Thus, for instance, 
the Commission could adopt a presumptive maximum sentence lower than 
one that would be required by retributive analysis (although not one that 
would be too lenient under that analysis) for any class of drug offender that 
research shows is particularly amenable to substance abuse treatment.62 
Furthermore, Tentative Draft No. 1 expresses no preference for any 
                                                                                                                     
number of states have elected to create temporary sentencing commissions, or have abolished 
standing commissions at some point after the commission’s guidelines have taken effect.” Id. at 48. 
 56. Id. § 6A.02, at 58–61. This provision sets out two options, one of which would establish 
an eleven-member Commission and one of which would establish a twenty-two-member 
Commission. Id. The commentary states that, since “[n]o one formula for a commission’s 
composition has proven superior,” the MPCS merely sets out possible options. Id. at 62. 
 57. See id. § 6A.02, at 58–61 (listing types of individuals who should be on the Commission). 
 58. Id. § 6A.04(1), at 90 (requiring development of guidelines); id. § 6B.03(4), at 178 
(noting,“[t]he guidelines should invite sentencing courts to individualize sentencing decisions in 
light of the purposes in § 1.02(2)(a), and the guidelines may not foreclose the individualization of 
sentences in light of those considerations”). 
 59. Id. § 6A.04, at 90 (setting out “initial responsibilities” of the Commission). 
 60. Id. § 6A.05, at 99–103 (setting out “ongoing responsibilities” of the Commission); id. 
§ 6A.09, at 147 (requiring “omnibus review of [the] sentencing system . . . [e]very [ten] years”). 
Section 6A.06 also calls for the development of a “community corrections strategy,” which can be 
carried out either as part of the Commission’s initial responsibilities or at some later point in time. 
Id. § 6A.06, at 129–30. 
 61. Id. § 6B.02(1), at 159–60 (requiring development of presumptive guidelines); id. § 6B.03, 
at 177 (requiring that presumptive guidelines conform to the purposes of punishment in § 1.02(2)). 
 62. See id. § 6B.03 illus. 1, at 181. 
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particular utilitarian goal, so long as its effect does not exceed the desert-
based range. Thus, the commentary states: 
[A] commission might promulgate a guideline stating that, for 
serious violent offenses, the primary purposes to be weighed 
by sentencing courts should be retribution and incapacitation 
of the offender. Another guideline might provide that, for 
certain kinds of property crime, the leading considerations 
ought to be restitution to the crime victim and specific 
deterrence of the offender through the application of 
economic sanctions. For categories of cases at the lowest end 
of the gravity scale, the guidelines may direct the courts 
chiefly to restorative sentences that address the needs of 
victims, offenders, and their communities.63  
Tentative Draft No. 1 also contemplates that the presumptive guidelines 
will consist of relatively narrow ranges, a stipulation meant to promote 
consistency, enhance perceptions of fairness, and facilitate predictability 
about prison populations.64 However, the Draft also emphasizes that 
sentences in particular cases are ultimately to be fashioned by judges, who 
have authority to depart from the presumptive range, limited only by 
appellate review.65 Thus, while the Commission is charged with 
developing a list of aggravating and mitigating factors that support such 
departures, its list is non-exclusive and may not ascribe a particular 
duration to any aggravators or mitigators.66 Further, whether they come 
from the Commission or the courts, departure factors can derive from 
either retributive or utilitarian principles and target virtually any 
characteristic or conduct of the defendant, subject to four caveats. First, 
race, gender, creed, national origin, and the like generally may not be 
considered.67 Second, in order to conform to Blakely, all aggravators that 
                                                                                                                     
 63. Id. at 183. 
 64. Id. § 6B.04(3), at 192 (“Ranges of incarceration terms should be sufficiently narrow to 
express meaningful distinctions across categories of cases on grounds of proportionality, to promote 
reasonable uniformity in sentences imposed and served, and to facilitate reliable projections of 
correctional populations using the correctional-population forecasting model in § 6A.07.”). 
 65. Id. § 6B.04(1), at 191 (“The guidelines shall have presumptive legal force in the 
sentencing of individual offenders by sentencing courts, subject to judicial discretion to depart from 
the guidelines as set forth in § 7.XX.”). Section 7.XX is one of a number of provisions not yet 
officially adopted by the ALI. It states, inter alia, that judges may depart from the presumptive 
guidelines provided they justify the decision in writing, subject to appellate confirmation that the 
departure is justified by “substantial circumstances” in ordinary cases and by “extraordinary and 
compelling circumstances” when the departure is more than twice the guidelines maximum. Id. 
§ 7.XX, at 264–65. 
 66. Id. § 6B.04(4), at 193. 
 67. Id. § 6B.06(2)(a), at 211. 
9
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are “jury sentencing facts” (which, under the Supreme Court’s 
jurisprudence, may be virtually all aggravators except prior convictions)68 
must be proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.69 Third, alleged 
criminal conduct that has not led to conviction may not form the basis of 
an aggravator.70 Finally, neither aggravators nor mitigators may be used to 
produce sentences that fall outside desert-based limits, a rule to be 
enforced by the appellate courts.71  
IV.   THE COUNCIL DRAFT 
The preliminary version of Tentative Draft No. 2 (called a Council 
Draft because it is presented to the ALI Council and revised there prior to 
full ALI review)72 rests on these building blocks. Its most controversial 
proposal, albeit one that is not surprising in light of the 2003 Report and 
Tentative Draft No. 1, is the abolition of back-end release decision-making 
by parole boards.73 Instead, sentences are to be fixed at the front-end, 
meaning that sentencing authority is to reside in the Commission as a 
general matter and in trial judges and the appellate courts in specific cases. 
The commentary for this proposal argues that, with few exceptions, the 
trial court possesses all relevant dispositional information at the time of 
sentencing.74 Relative desert, based on crimes already committed, can be 
calibrated immediately after conviction and, given the static nature of most 
risk and treatment factors, the need for incapacitation and the usefulness of 
rehabilitation can also be measured at that time (assuming such 
measurement is “reasonably feasible” at all).75  
                                                                                                                     
 68. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., 6 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 787 (3d ed. 2007) (noting the 
Apprendi Court “held that regardless of how a fact is designated by a legislature, that fact must be 
proven beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury, if it is a fact other than prior conviction, and it 
authorizes the imposition of a penalty that is more severe than the penalty authorized by law for the 
offense of conviction alone”). 
 69. Tentative Draft No. 1 sets out a complex procedure for assuring Blakely’s stipulations are 
met. See MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 7.07B, at 296–98 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2007). 
 70. Id. § 6B.06(2)(b), (3), at 211–12. This limitation is meant to reject the “real offense” 
sentencing that predominates in the federal system, a process that permits sentence enhancements 
based on allegedly criminal conduct that was not prosecuted or was found not to be criminal by a 
court. Id. at 217–20. 
 71. Id. at 201. 
 72. See Reitz, supra note 38, at 688. 
 73. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6.10(1), at 51 (Council Draft No. 2, 2008). 
 74. Id. at 9–10 (noting that behavior in prison is seldom predictive of behavior once 
released).  
 75. In further support of this position, the Council Draft includes a fascinating account of 
research suggesting that (1) offenders released after determinate sentences are no less likely to be 
“rehabilitated” than those subject to parole board release-decision-making; and (2) determinate, 
guidelines-oriented systems are probably more likely to slow the growth of prison populations than 
indeterminate regimes, perhaps because of the system-wide attention to resource allocation that 
 
10
Florida Law Review, Vol. 61, Iss. 4 [2009], Art. 1
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol61/iss4/1
2009] INTRODUCTION TO THE SYMPOSIUM ON THE MODEL PENAL CODE’S SENTENCING PROPOSALS 675 
 
Even if dramatic changes in the offender’s character or risk do 
significantly alter the retributive or utilitarian analysis after sentence has 
been imposed, the Council Draft permits these factors to reduce only the 
lengthiest sentences (those that last more than fifteen years)76 and those 
imposed on individuals who have since developed serious physical or 
mental infirmities or become advanced in age.77 The Council Draft 
recognizes only two other situations where sentences may be shortened 
after they have been imposed, neither of which involves upsetting the trial 
court’s sentencing judgment. Courts must grant credit for time already 
served for the crime in question,78 and each sentence is automatically 
reduced fifteen percent for “good behavior” unless the offender commits a 
criminal offense or serious disciplinary infraction or “fails to participate 
satisfactorily in work, education or other rehabilitation programs.”79  
With respect to the precise length of the sentences, the Council Draft 
suggests five categories of felonies (as compared to the old Code’s three 
categories),80 with maxima of life, twenty years, ten years, five years and 
three years, respectively.81 Post-release supervision is encouraged, but as 
with the old Code, this supervision is to be imposed independently of 
prison sentence rather than, as occurs in many parole regimes, incorporated 
into sentence duration.82 This arrangement is designed to avoid the illogic 
of visiting the longest post-release supervision on those who receive the 
maximum suspension of sentence for good behavior and the shortest 
supervision on those who deserve no such credit.83 The Council Draft also 
prohibits mandatory minimum prison sentences84 on the ground that 
judges, rather than legislatures, commissions, or prosecutors, should be the 
ultimate arbiters of desert.85 
A final aspect of the Council Draft worth mentioning given its 
relevance to many of the articles in this Symposium is the role it assigns 
risk assessments in the sentencing process. The Council Draft permits 
                                                                                                                     
sentencing commissions provide. Id at 13–30. 
 76. Id. § 6.10A(1), at 58. As currently drafted, Section 6.10A(1) allows a judge to reduce or 
terminate a sentence for an offender who has served at least fifteen years if the judge finds that 
desert or incapacitative goals are no longer met by the original sentence. See also id. at 60. 
However, Professor Reitz has indicated that the judicial component of this provision will be 
eliminated and that the entire provision is likely to undergo substantial change in future revisions. 
E-mail from Professor Reitz to Professor Slobogin, Feb. 13, 2009 (on file with author). 
 77. Id. § 6.10A(2), at 58. 
 78. Id. § 7.09, at 76. 
 79. Id. § 3.05.1(2), at 78. 
 80. MODEL PENAL CODE § 6.01 (1962). 
 81. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6.01(1), at 32 (Council Draft No. 2, 2008). 
 82. Id. § 6.10(2), at 51. 
 83. Id. § 6.10 cmt. d, at 52–53. 
 84. Id. § 3.05.6(6), at 85. 
 85. Id. § 6.06 cmt. c, at 39–40. 
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sentencing commissions to construct presumptive guidelines that permit 
low-risk felons to avoid prison entirely, assuming a non-prison term is not 
too lenient under desert principles.86 Conversely, high-risk offenders may 
be assigned enhanced sentences,87 although again desert determines the 
outer limits of such sentences and the risk factors must be proven to a jury 
in accordance with Blakely.88 To facilitate rational exercise of this risk 
assessment authority, the Council Draft also directs the Commission to 
develop and update instruments for needs and risk assessment and to 
incorporate them into the Guidelines when they prove “sufficiently 
reliable.”89 
V.  THE ARTICLES IN THIS SYMPOSIUM90 
We are fortunate to have as the first contributor in this Symposium the 
Reporter for the Model Penal Code sentencing project, Kevin Reitz, a law 
professor at the University of Minnesota. After emphasizing the 
importance of looking at the states (as opposed to the federal system) when 
considering various reform routes, Professor Reitz’s article, Demographic 
Impact Statements, O’Connor’s Warning, and the Mysteries of Prison 
Release: Topics from a Sentencing Reform Agenda, focuses on three 
aspects of the MPCS project: the demographic impact statement (DIS), 
presumptive sentencing, and the extent to which sentences should be 
determinate. Analogous to environmental or fiscal impact statements, 
demographic impact statements under the MPCS would accompany each 
sentencing proposal, and “[a]t a minimum . . . model the racial, ethnic, and 
gender composition of future sentencing populations if the proposed 
change in sentencing law were to take effect.”91 Although the DIS 
requirement in Tentative Draft No.1 has not been controversial within the 
ALI, only two states have a similar provision92 and the political risk 
inherent in pointing out the differential racial impact of sentences could 
create considerable resistance to this proposal. Nonetheless, Professor 
Reitz makes a good case for the requirement and explores the types of 
information and the possible impacts it might generate.93 
                                                                                                                     
 86. Id. § 6B.09(3), at 62. 
 87. Id. § 6B.09 cmt. e, at 64–65. 
 88. Id. at 65. 
 89. Id. § 6B.09(1), at 62. 
 90. Douglas A. Berman, Kevin R. Reitz, Alice Ristroph, and Robert Weisberg presented a 
version of their articles at a panel at the American Association of Law Schools in San Diego on 
January 9, 2009, sponsored by the Criminal Justice and moderated by the author. Symposium, 
Model Penal Code: Sentencing, 61 FLA. L. REV. 665 (2009). Nora V. Demleitner and Michael H. 
Marcus did not present at the panel. 
 91. Reitz, supra note 38, at 690-91. 
 92. Minnesota’s Commission authorized the DIS in 2007. Id. at 693; see also IOWA CODE 
§ 2.56(1) (West 2008). 
 93. Reitz, supra note 38, at 689–96. 
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Professor Reitz then explains, in terms consistent with the above 
discussion, why Tentative Draft No. 1 endorsed a presumptive sentencing 
guidelines system rather than either an advisory guidelines approach (in 
which departures from the guidelines range are not reviewable or only 
perfunctorily so) or an entirely indeterminate regime.94 He also describes 
various state reactions to Blakeley and Booker, all of which move away 
from presumptive sentences.95 Agreeing with Justice O’Connor’s dissents 
in these cases,96 Professor Reitz views these developments as unfortunate, 
and hopes the MPCS project will provide an impetus in the opposite 
direction.97 Finally, he notes that, despite Tentative Draft No. 1’s 
preference for determinate sentences, the Council Draft does permit some 
back-end adjustments (in the downward direction), most controversially 
through its provision allowing modification of lengthy sentences.98 He 
makes the case for the importance of this provision, especially given the 
popularity of life without parole and long mandatory minima.99 
The rest of the articles in this Symposium tend to be critical of the 
MPCS project, especially its orientation toward desert. In The Enduring 
(and Again Timely) Wisdom of the Original MPC Sentencing 
Provisions,100 Professor Douglas Berman, Ohio State law professor and 
indefatigable publisher of the Sentencing Law and Policy blog,101 calls the 
MPCS project a “missed opportunity”102 because of its failure to address 
directly the huge incarceration rates in this country, which dwarf those of 
other Western countries and result in more imprisoned people in the U.S. 
than in China.103 Professor Berman reminds us that the original Code and 
even its updated commentaries (as late as 1979) made a strong statement 
against imprisonment; the latter source asserts, for instance, that “[t]here is 
no offense as to which imprisonment is absolutely required, except 
possibly murder,”104 and makes clear that prisoners who are rehabilitated 
should usually be released.105 Noting that the increase in incarceration and 
                                                                                                                     
 94. Id. at 699. 
 95. Id. at 701–02. 
 96. In particular, see Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 314–26 (2004) (O’Connor, J., 
dissenting). 
 97. Reitz, supra note 38, at 702–03. 
 98. Id. at 704–05. 
 99. Id. at 705–06. 
 100. See Douglas A. Berman, The Enduring (and Again Timely) Wisdom of the Original MPC 
Sentencing Provisions, 61 FLA. L. REV. 709 (2009). 
 101. Sentencing Law and Policy, http://sentencing.typepad.com (last visited June 29, 2009). 
 102. Berman, supra note 100, at 709. 
 103. Id. at 711. 
 104. Introduction to Articles 6 and 7 to MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES: PART I  
§§ 6.01 to 7.09, at 8–9 (1985). 
 105. Id. 
13
Slobigin: Introduction to the Symposium on the Model Penal Code's Sentencin
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2009
678 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61 
 
extremely long sentences in this country coincided with the rejection of the 
rehabilitative ideal,106 Berman fears that the MPCS’ adoption of limiting 
retributivism and its goals of promoting determinate sentences and 
eliminating parole boards will at best do nothing to reverse these trends, 
and might even exacerbate them.107 While Berman concedes that the 
expertise of sentencing commissions can lead to more rational policy 
decisions, he is not optimistic that legislatures will listen to commissions 
and is fearful that a system that focuses on defining sentence ranges at the 
front-end according to desert is easily manipulated into producing 
mandatory or increasingly harsher dispositions.108 In any event, he 
suggests, without the moderating effect of parole decision-making at the 
back-end, even a sentencing regime created by a progressive commission 
will be unable to take into account the myriad of mitigating factors that 
should lead to early release.109  
Seton Hall Law Professor Alice Ristroph, in How (Not) to Think Like a 
Punisher,110 likewise expresses skepticism about the new Code’s adoption 
of retributivism as a guiding philosophy.111 To her, sentencing is first and 
foremost a political statement about state power; its role as a device for 
punishing offenders is secondary. Thus, fashioning sentences around desert 
principles (or on any other theory of punishment) is short-sighted.112 She 
notes that the new Code seems to recognize this point in its provisions 
calling for fiscal and demographic impact statements, evidence-based 
sentencing, uniformity and parsimony, none of which are necessarily tied 
to retribution or other theories of punishment.113 However, she also argues 
that the Code’s focus on limiting retributivism means that sentencing 
commissions, trial judges, and appellate judges may have to make 
decisions that are in tension with these intended limitations on state 
power.114 Once it is determined that an offender deserves a particular 
sentence or sentence range, considerations such as cost, racial disparities, 
offender risk and other non-desert variables are much harder to integrate 
into the decision.115 As Ristroph notes,  
[A] moral claim that an offender deserves ten years in prison 
is not affected by the fact that the state cannot afford to 
                                                                                                                     
 106. Berman, supra note 100, at 715. 
 107. Id. at 721. 
 108. Id. at 722–23. 
 109. Id. at 724–25. 
 110. Alice Ristroph, How (Not) to Think Like a Punisher, 61 FLA. L. REV. 727 (2009). 
 111. See id. at 727–28. 
 112. Id. at 728. 
 113. Id. at 729. 
 114. Id. at 744–45. 
 115. Id. at 746–49. 
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support him, or that the offender’s incarceration will further 
exacerbate racial disproportions in the prison 
population . . . . The danger of desert is that it preserves the 
possibility that some will say the costs are worth it, the 
inequities deserved.116 
Finally, Ristroph argues that this tension between the retributive theory 
of punishment and more practical, evidence-based goals is exacerbated by 
desert’s elasticity; claims of desert are not “falsifiable” in the same way 
these practical claims are.117 Indeed, the public arguably has as much 
expertise as judges in deciding how much punishment is proportionate to 
offense gravity.118 If judges have expertise about proportionality, Ristroph 
suggests, it is not with respect to desert, but rather in terms of balancing all 
of the foregoing considerations against the government’s contention that an 
offender should be deprived of liberty.119 
Michael H. Marcus, an Oregon state trial judge who has championed 
“smart sentencing” focused on promoting public safety,120 expresses even 
greater concerns about the retributive cast of the new Codein his article, 
MPC—The Root of the Problem: Just Deserts and Risk Assessment.121 
Disagreeing with the Code’s unwillingness to accord significant weight to 
risk differentials except in extreme cases, Judge Marcus believes that risk 
assessments should heavily influence all sentences.122 He argues that, 
despite their inevitable uncertainty, such assessments would not create 
“false positives” because they would merely allocate where offenders end 
up—in prison or in the community—not whether they should be 
punished.123 Furthermore, like Ristroph, he considers determinations of 
desert to be at least as unstable as assessments of risk.124 
More fundamentally, Judge Marcus sees no point in basing the typical 
sentence on desert unless doing so enhances public safety.125 Of en the two 
considerations are at odds, not just because a dangerous person might not 
be blameworthy (or vice versa), but because characteristics that appear 
mitigating—youth, addiction, impaired functioning—are frequently risk 
                                                                                                                     
 116. Id. at 746–48. 
 117. Id. at 748. 
 118. Id. at 740. 
 119. Id. at 745. 
 120. See Michael H. Marcus, Future Trends in State Courts 2006: Smart Sentencing: Public 
Safety, Public Trust and Confidence Through Evidence-Based Dispositions, TRENDS (2006), 
available at http://sentencing.nj.gov/downloads/pdf/articles/2006/Oct2006/document05.pdf. 
 121. See Michael H. Marcus, MPC—The Root of the Problem: Just Deserts and Risk 
Assessment, 61 FLA. L. REV. 751, 751–52 (2009). 
 122. Id. at 756. 
 123. Id. at 754–55. 
 124. Id. at 753–54. 
 125. Id. at 752. 
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factors.126 Judge Marcus concedes that the imperatives of desert and public 
safety might overlap when bucking the public’s desire for retribution 
would lead to vigilantism or disrespect for and non-compliance with the 
system, but he asserts that before sentences are affected by such 
considerations there must be concrete demonstration of their impact, 
especially if sentence ranges, like those imposed under the new Code, 
purport to be “evidence-based.”127 In any event, Judge Marcus argues, any 
public dissatisfaction with the criminal law that does occur most likely 
stems from the perception that it is failing to protect the public.128 For 
Judge Marcus, only in a small subset of cases—perhaps, for instance, a 
homicide committed by a one-time drunk driver—should desert concerns 
trump a public safety orientation at sentencing.129 
In her article, Good Conduct Time: How Much and For Whom?: The 
Unprincipled Approach of the Model Penal Code: Sentencing,130 Professor 
Nora V. Demleitner, Dean at Hofstra Law School, more gently chastises 
the MPCS project. Her article focuses on the MPCS’ position on good time 
credits (which is considerably less generous than the old C de).131 She 
notes that such credits can dramatically increase participation in 
rehabilitation programs, provide incentives to cooperate with prison 
authorities, and give prisoners reason to believe they control their fate at 
least to some extent, thus enhancing their “ability to operate as 
independent actors.”132 Accordingly, she advocates good time credits of up 
to one-third of the sentence, with a 15% reduction for good conduct and 
the remainder granted for satisfactory participation in rehabilitation 
programs, all of which should be non-revocable (in contrast to the rule in 
every state).133 She also admits, however, that the crediting process needs 
greater transparency and clearer criteria.134  
Finally, the article by Stanford Law Professor Robert Weisberg, entitled 
Tragedy, Skepticism, Empirics, and the MPCS,135 proffers a “tragic” but 
                                                                                                                     
 126. Id. at 768–69. 
 127. Id. at 771–72. 
 128. Id. at 764–65. 
 129. Id. at 775. 
 130. Nora V. Demleitner, Good Conduct Time: How Much and For Whom?: The 
Unprincipled Approach of the Model Penal Code: Sentencing, 61 FLA. L. REV. 777 (2009). 
 131. Id. at 779–80. As noted above, the MPCS would automatically grant a 15% reduction 
unless misconduct occurs. See supra note 79 and accompanying text. The old Code automatically 
reduced sentence by at least 20% and in cases of exceptional performance by another 20%. MODEL 
PENAL CODE § 305.1 (1962). 
 132. Demleitner, supra note 130, at 794-95. 
 133. Id. at 790, 795-96. 
 134. Id. at 795-96. 
 135. Robert Weisberg, Tragedy, Skepticism, Empirics, and the MPCS, 60 FLA. L. REV. 797 
(2009). 
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ultimately optimistic view of our ability to resolve the kinds of issues 
raised in the foregoing articles. He notes that, while the MPCS calls for 
evidence-based sentencing, it does not directly address how we are to 
determine whether the sentences it produces enhance public safety, save 
taxpayer money, or reduce prison populations.136 For instance, he asks, 
how can we tell whether judges at the front-end are better than parole 
boards at the back-end at judging risk and rehabilitation?137 And how do 
we decide whether determinate sentencing is more likely than 
indeterminate sentencing to increase prison populations?138 The MPCS 
commentary presents some statistics suggesting that judges and 
determinate sentencing are no worse than parole boards and indeterminate 
sentencing in these respects.139 But, relying in large part on Frank 
Zimring’s work,140 Professor Weisberg shows that most attempts to 
provide even approximately concrete answers to questions about whether 
particular criminal justice policies have any effect founder on intractable 
methodological and conceptual conundrums.141  
So, Professor Weisberg suggests, policy that rests on empirical 
foundations may depend on how we assign the burden of proof.142 And 
perhaps the burden should be particularly high when, as with sentencing 
reform, the research results encourage significant structural change that 
would be implemented by legislators, who are often not adverse to grand-
standing.143 In the meantime, Professor Weisberg suggests, we might want 
to consider a number of modest empirical projects—focusing on relatively 
simple ways of measuring crime and recidivism rates, racial and ethnic 
disparity, imprisonment costs, and public “satisfaction” with criminal 
justice—that could incrementally provide us with relevant information and 
make us feel more comfortable about attempting evidence-based decisions 
in the sentencing context.144  
These thought-provoking articles should stimulate debate within the 
ALI, academia, and the public at large. As the introduction to Tentative 
Draft No. 1 states, sentencing is by far the most important criminal justice 
issue.145 I, like many of the authors in this Symposium, am suspicious of a 
                                                                                                                     
 136. Id. at 813-23. 
 137. Id. at 800, 812. 
 138. Id. at 802-03. 
 139. See supra note 75 and accompanying text. 
 140. FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE GREAT AMERICAN CRIME DECLINE 195–207 (2007). See 
generally FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING &  GORDON HAWKINS, THE SCALE OF IMPRISONMENT (1991) 
(discussing the role and impact of imprisonment in criminal sentencing). 
 141. Weisberg, supra note 135, at 802-04. 
 142. Id. at 811. 
 143. Id. at 812. 
 144. Id. at 817-25. 
 145. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING, Reporter’s Introductory Memorandum xxviii 
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sentencing regime that focuses on desert.146 I am also not as sanguine as 
the ALI that risk and needs assessments are better made at trial than on an 
on-going basis.147 But the MPCS by no means goes all the way down the 
retributive road, and its basic structure provides a framework for a wide 
array of compromises that could work politically and conceptually. For 
instance, as noted above, the MPCS would allow non-prison sentences for 
low risk offenders and enhanced sentences for high risk offenders.148 
Implicit in these provisions is the assumption that both sentencing 
commissions and appellate courts should recognize that our “moral 
calipers” are very flexible, and thus should give trial judges substantial 
discretion to implement utilitarian objectives. The MPCS is also willing to 
countenance development of a calculus for equating community sanctions 
and treatment programs with prison time,149 which would increase the 
possibility that the latter disposition becomes the exception rather than the 
rule, and would, in effect, make treatment providers, monitored by judges, 
key decision-makers. No sentencing regime will come close to achieving 
all the goals we would like, but the MPCS project, to date, has not 
foreclosed pursuing any of them. The articles in this Symposium provide a 
good platform for considering the many options still open to the ALI in its 
revision of the Model Penal Code’s sentencing provisions. 
                                                                                                                     
(Tentative Draft No. 1, 2007).  
 146. See generally CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, MINDING JUSTICE: LAWS THAT DEPRIVE PEOPLE 
WITH MENTAL DISABILITY OF LIFE AND LIBERTY 152–77 (2006) (discussing feasibility of a 
preventive system of justice). See also Christopher Slobogin, The Civilization of the Criminal Law, 
58 VAND. L. REV. 121, 129–44 (2005) (same). 
 147. The claim that most risk factors are static is inaccurate. Ten of the twenty items on the 
HCR-20, a highly regarded structured risk assessment instrument, involve non-historical 
characteristics. See Kevin S. Douglas & Christopher D. Webster, The HCR-20 Violence Risk 
Assessment Scheme: Concurrent Validity in a Sample of Incarcerated Offenders, 26 CRIM. JUST. &  
BEHAV. 3, 8 (1999). Moreover, if, as should often be the case, disposition involves the community 
rather than prison, dynamic risk factors can be evaluated in an ecologically valid way. 
 148. See supra notes 86–89 and accompanying text. 
 149. See MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 1.02(2)(b)(iv), at 2 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2007) 
(encouraging intermediate sanctions); id. § 6A.06, at 129 (requiring development of a “community 
corrections strategy”); id. § 6B.02(6), at 159 (guidelines must address community sanctions). 
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